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Abstract. The authority to manage natural capital often follows political boundaries
rather than ecological. This mismatch can lead to unsustainable outcomes, as spillovers from
one management area to the next may create adverse incentives for local decision making, even
within a single country. At the same time, one-size-fits-all approaches of federal (centralized)
authority can fail to respond to state (decentralized) heterogeneity and can result in inefficient
economic or detrimental ecological outcomes. Here we utilize a spatially explicit coupled natu-
ral–human system model of a fishery to illuminate trade-offs posed by the choice between fed-
eral vs. state control of renewable resources. We solve for the dynamics of fishing effort and
fish stocks that result from different approaches to federal management that vary in terms of
flexibility. Adapting numerical methods from engineering, we also solve for the open-loop
Nash equilibrium characterizing state management outcomes, where each state anticipates and
responds to the choices of the others. We consider traditional federalism questions (state vs.
federal management) as well as more contemporary questions about the economic and ecologi-
cal impacts of shifting regulatory authority from one level to another. The key mechanisms
behind the trade-offs include whether differences in local conditions are driven by biological or
economic mechanisms; degree of flexibility embedded in the federal management; the spatial
and temporal distribution of economic returns across states; and the status-quo management
type. While simple rules-of-thumb are elusive, our analysis reveals the complex political econ-
omy dimensions of renewable resource federalism.
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INTRODUCTION
The authority to manage natural capital tends to fall
within political boundaries instead of aligning with eco-
logical systems. Renewable biological resources comprise
one category of natural capital that is particularly prone
to mismatches between the spatial extent of the resource
and political boundaries. Addressing problematic mis-
matches between the spatial extent of renewable
resources and boundaries of management authority is
critical for sustainability (Crowder et al. 2006).
In cases where natural resources cross international
boundaries, a large multidisciplinary literature has stud-
ied the problem of structuring international agreements
to balance member country incentives while ensuring
sustainable outcomes for the resources governed under
the agreement (Munro 1979, Levhari and Mirman 1980,
Fischer and Mirman 1992, 1996). Voluntary agreements
among countries have had mixed success with addressing
management failures for resources that cross interna-
tional boundaries (Barrett 2016, Dannenberg and Bar-
rett 2018).
Within countries, boundaries of management author-
ity are in principle more malleable and typically deter-
mined by the system of government. In the United
States and other countries with federal systems of gov-
ernment, semi-autonomous regions (i.e., states, pro-
vinces, territories) exist under a central federal
government. In these systems, the authority to manage a
renewable resource may be held by the federal govern-
ment, or it may be decentralized and held by one or
more states, provinces, or territories. For example, in the
United States, coastal states or state coalitions (e.g.,
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Atlantic States Commission) manage a fishery within
three nautical miles (1 nautical mile = 1.852 km) of
shore, often in partnership with the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration. In Canada, provincial
governments have primary authority to control the cap-
turing and killing of wildlife within their jurisdiction,
while the federal government has superseding authority
to protect wildlife designated as species at risk (Illical
and Harrison 2007).
Our research addresses a fundamental question: for a
given renewable resource, what trade-offs arise when
management authority may be held at either the federal
government level (centralized) or be decentralized to
state, provincial, or territorial governments?
Renewable resource federalism is not just of theoretical
interest, as many countries are reevaluating the level of
management authority over resources. For example, sev-
eral countries in Southeast Asia have undergone a trans-
formation in the last 10 yr to more decentralized control
of natural resources (Aden 2001). In the European Union
(EU), a multinational entity with federal characteristics,
controversy over the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy was
a prominent issue in the United Kingdom’s referendum
over leaving the EU and the subsequent negotiations to
leave the bloc (Phillipson and Symes 2018). In the United
States, the Modern Fish Act (S.1520) is moving the man-
agement of the recreational red snapper fishery from fed-
eral to state authorities. Lands owned or administered by
the federal government comprise about 21% of the area of
the lower 48 states (Libecap 2018). One motivation for the
“land transfer movement” that advocates handing owner-
ship or authority of federal lands to the states is greater
control by states over the renewable resources they con-
tain (Ruple 2018).
Pollution management in federal systems also poses
trade-offs on management authority (Oates 2001). In
the United States, regulatory authority has oscillated
between periods of relatively greater state or federal
management of pollution (Elliott et al. 1985). Literature
on environmental federalism has shown that decentral-
ized management can be more economically efficient
due to the availability of better information about local
costs and benefits of pollution control, beneficial effects
of inter-state regulatory competition, or the relative
inflexibility of centralized management (Oates and Sch-
wab 1988, Wellisch 1995, Ulph 2000, List and Mason
2001, Kunce and Shogren 2002, 2005, Muller and Men-
delsohn 2009). Two drawbacks of decentralization are
also noted: (1) trans-boundary spillovers from pollution
control policies and (2) the incentive for individual states
to “race to the bottom” by lowering standards to attract
polluting economic activity. Oates (2001:9) succinctly
summarizes the trade-offs highlighted in the pollution
control case: “[W]e are left with a choice between two
alternatives: suboptimal local decisions on environmen-
tal quality or inefficient uniform national standards.
And which of these two alternatives leads to a higher
level of social welfare is, in principle, unclear.”
Renewable resource federalism shares a number of
parallels with pollution control. For example, an emerg-
ing theoretical literature illustrates how centralized man-
agement of renewable resources has the advantage of a
broader potential spatial scale of intervention (Smith
et al. 2009, Sims et al. 2010, Epanchin-Niell and Wilen
2014, Kling et al. 2016), while decentralized manage-
ment can perform well through greater flexibility with
respect to local conditions of a resource (Sanchirico and
Wilen 2005) or local stakeholder preferences (Costello
and Kaffine 2017). Regulatory authority will oscillate
between periods of relatively greater state or federal
management of renewable resources as control of the
executive and legislative branches shift.
Here we illustrate how renewable resource federalism
trade-offs are more nuanced than the prior literature has
demonstrated. Specifically, we show how the magnitude
and nature of the trade-offs depend on the factors driv-
ing local differences (ecological or economic), the kind
of policy instruments employed (standard vs. market
based), the status quo management regime (central or
decentralized), and how the benefits and costs of a man-
agement regime are distributed across jurisdiction. Con-
sidering these dimensions together is crucial in order to
illuminate the political-economy issues surrounding dif-
ferent scales of management and to provide a richer pic-
ture of the benefits and costs to policymakers. For
example, questions about the preferred scale and scope
of resource management often hide disagreements
among local governments. These disagreements, how-
ever, are critical since shifts to more efficient manage-
ment of the resource may require consensus among all
impacted jurisdictions.
MODELS AND RESULTS
This paper evaluates the performance of federal (cen-
tralized) and state (decentralized or sub-national) man-
agement of renewable resources in terms of the
economic value of extraction from a resource stock over
time. We base our analysis on a simple but flexible spa-
tial-dynamic bioeconomic optimal control model of a
fishery (see Methods for more details). The model
assumes a single country’s resource stock spans two
states. Here we use “state” to refer to a sub-national
management jurisdiction. The model includes dynamic
variables that represent the resource stock biomass that
resides under the authority of each state. State-level fish
stocks are connected spatially through biological disper-
sal that depends on the relative biomass density in the
two states (Sanchirico and Wilen 1999). We consider two
sources of state-level heterogeneity that shape the degree
of biomass spillover in the system: biological (differences
in resource productivity in each state) and economic
(difference in harvesting costs in each state). Following
the pollution control literature, we investigate how
heterogeneity in local conditions interacts with spillover
across states (here rate of fish dispersal) to determine the
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trade-offs associated with management at different levels
of government.
The human component of our coupled human-natural
system model accommodates governance alternatives
consistent with federalism and fishing. We consider sev-
eral different federal management types, including: the
optimal economic management approach that maxi-
mizes system-wide economic returns using a dynamic
and spatially explicit policy (commonly labeled the
“first-best” policy); and a selection of policies that apply
uniformly over space. Federal management that is
dynamic, forward looking, but spatially uniform repre-
sents a one-size-fits-all approach that is typical of federal
systems (Arrow et al. 1996). In practice, spatially uni-
form policies may be chosen due to a lack of information
needed to tailor policies to local conditions; however,
they are perhaps more likely to be motivated by equity
or procedural fairness considerations. An important
point is that uniform policies will in general fail to match
the system-wide performance of the first-best due to the
heterogeneity in the states. We further divide spatially
uniform federal policies into two categories: a uniform
limit on fishing effort (command-and-control) and a uni-
form quota price (market-based). Uniform effort may be
interpreted as a form of social policy aimed at preserving
employment in the resource sector in each state. The uni-
form quota price is the efficient market solution when
tradeable quota markets are linked and trading of quota
between the regions occurs on a one to one basis. See
Methods and Appendix S1: Sec S1.3 for additional
details.
The alternative to federal management is decentraliza-
tion, where each jurisdiction or state manages its
resource independently. In this setting, states are forward
looking and behave strategically in their own interests
knowing the actions of the other states. We operational-
ize this alternative as the outcome of a non-cooperative
dynamic game. Both states attempt to maximize their
economic return from harvesting the resource over time
by choosing effort levels in each period subject to the
actions of the other state. The outcome is that states pur-
sue a dynamic harvesting policy that is a Nash equilib-
rium of the interstate game (Kamien and Schwartz
1991). Our analysis therefore differs from most of the
prior pollution or renewable resource federalism litera-
ture that only look at the long-run equilibrium outcomes
or consider special functional forms that simplify the
dynamic solutions to be time invariant (Costello and
Kaffine 2017). Solving for dynamic paths of harvesting
effort in the interstate game is a challenging numerical
problem. Adapting methods from the engineering and
optimal control literature (Guangyan et al. 2016,
Nikooeinejad et al. 2016), we develop a numerical
approach to quickly and robustly solve for the Nash
equilibrium dynamic paths.
Under either governance alternative, federal or state,
the objective is to maximize the discounted profit gener-
ated by harvesting the resource over time (net present
value, NPV). We assume a simple market structure
where the per-unit price of the resource is the same in
both states and is not responsive to overall output. An
implication of this assumption is that choices made by
another state are only relevant to a particular state by
virtue of the effect on resource (fish) dispersal, which
may in turn influence state-level resource productivity
and levels. These two regulatory alternatives capture a
key trade-off in federal systems: state management can
tailor policies to local conditions but federal manage-
ment has more control over spillovers among states.
To facilitate comparison across management regimes,
we consider a common initial condition for the fishery
where an absence of regulation results in the fish stock
in each state being depleted to 20% of the state-level car-
rying capacity. Starting from this point, fishing effort
may either be regulated by the federal government or by
the states and in either case the fish population will
undergo a period of rebuilding. Before pitting the differ-
ent centralized and decentralized regimes against each
other, we compare each against the first-best spatially
explicit time-varying policy. Because by definition the
first-best achieves the optimal paths of effort and stock
and greatest NPV, we measure performance of each
regime as the percent decrease in the aggregate NPV of
profits (Eq. 3) under a given management type, relative
to the NPV under first-best management (Fig. 1).
We evaluate performance in the presence of each
source of spatial heterogeneity (biological and eco-
nomic) by varying the degree of heterogeneity across a
continuum of rates of fish dispersal from none to almost
half of the growth rate. With no heterogeneity, each state
is identical and both one-size-fits-all federal policies
achieve the first-best outcome of maximized fishing
profits (Fig. 1A, B, D, E). Decentralized state-level man-
agement achieves the first-best outcome with no biologi-
cal dispersal (Fig. 1C and F), as what is best for each
state in this case is best for the system (regardless of how
different the conditions in the states are).
Neither spatially uniform federal management nor
state management is able to achieve the first-best out-
come with dispersal between heterogeneous states.
Intuitively, the greater the heterogeneity in local condi-
tions, the better policies that reflect the underlying
heterogeneity will do (state) and the greater the spil-
lover or dispersal between the states, the better policies
at larger scales will do (federal). Indeed, we find these
patterns across both economic and ecological hetero-
geneity. For instance, since states optimize their man-
agement with respect to local resource conditions
(along with the behavior of the other state), we find
that the losses from decentralized state-level manage-
ment decrease with increased biological heterogeneity
across states and increase with greater rates of disper-
sal (Fig. 1C and F). In contrast, the performance of
federal management declines with increased hetero-
geneity since policies cannot be tailored to local
resource conditions.
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FIG. 1. Percent loss in the net present value (NPV) of fishery profits under uniform federal and state management (vertical axis)
relative to the first-best outcome. We measure percent loss varying the degree of interstate (economic or biological) heterogeneity
along the horizontal axis. Within each panel, the four lines correspond to zero (d = 0), low (d = 0.10), medium (d = 0.26), and high
(d = 0.40) dispersal rates. We consider (A–C) biological heterogeneity and (D–F) economic heterogeneity, where the level of both
types of spatial heterogeneity given by the horizontal axis. Biological heterogeneity is given by the percent difference in intrinsic
growth rate (r1) in state 1 relative to state 2. Economic heterogeneity is given by the percent difference in cost of harvesting (c21) in
state 2 relative to state 1. The three columns show, respectively, performance under a policy of (1) command and control (uniform
effort), (2) market-based regulation (uniform marginal profit), and (3) state-level management.
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Underlying the NPV results are transitional paths of
fishing effort and fish stocks in the different manage-
ment regimes (all of which start at the same initial condi-
tions, which are below the long-run equilibrium levels;
Fig. 2). Specifically, in each management regime and
heterogeneity scenario, we find that fish stocks increase
over time toward management regime specific equilib-
rium levels (steady states). Relative to the first best, state
management results in increased exploitation of the
resource in both states (lower fish stocks). The two fed-
eral uniform policies straddle the first best solution
where in one state fish stocks are higher, and in the other
the fish stocks are lower. The optimal one-size-fits-all
policies represent the "averaging" effects of these sort of
policies relative to the first-best policy (Sanchirico and
Wilen 2005). While intuition would lead one to conclude
that decentralized control has the highest rates of
exploitation and lowest stock levels, we find that in some
cases the one-size-fits-all approach can in fact lead to
lower stock levels due to the averaging effect (see, e.g.,
Fig. 2E). Because the goal also is to rebuild the popula-
tions, harvest moratoriums are part of the solution but
the duration depends on the management regime. For
example, in the case of biological heterogeneity, the
moratorium in state 1 is longer under the uniform-effort
regime than in the first-best and the market-based strat-
egy is much shorter. The implication is that the observed
dynamics of fish populations in coupled natural-human
systems are as much related to their management
regimes as they are to the biology.
While greater heterogeneity increases the losses associ-
ated with federal management, the magnitude of these
losses depends on the source of heterogeneity and the
dispersal rate. Market-based policies are better equipped
to handle small differences in economic value across the
system, as we find in the case of biological heterogeneity
(Fig. 1A and B). The larger differences in economic val-
ues that occur when we differentiate the conditions
based on the cost of harvesting, however, are more costly
to average over and thus result in greater losses (Fig. 1D
and E). Dispersal in this case acts to mitigate some of
the losses in the market-based federal policy, as the mag-
nitude and direction of net dispersal is endogenous and
biomass is moving along the economic gradient from
high cost fishing areas to lower cost fishing areas
(Appendix S1: Fig. S1C and D).
Under uniform effort federal policy, the role of biolog-
ical dispersal on the magnitude of the losses is more
nuanced due to the manner in which the policy interacts
with the biological dispersal mechanisms (Appendix S1:
Fig. S1A and B). In the case of biological heterogeneity,
dispersal flows from the high productive (greater eco-
nomic value) to the low productive state (lower eco-
nomic value) in essence making the lower productive
state more productive with higher economic value. Spil-
lover, therefore, mitigates the cost of the uniform effort
constraint, as it reduces the differences in productivity
and economic value. On the other hand, with economic
heterogeneity, net spillover is essentially zero in the com-
mand and control for all periods (Appendix S1:Fig. S1C
and D). At the same time in the first best policy, the
manager is able to align the biological and economic
gradient (spillover is moving to the low cost area due to
fishing effort levels) to maximize the value of the fishery.
The losses grow with greater heterogeneity as the value
of aligning the two gradients in terms of the overall
value of the system increases.
Certain insights from comparing federal and state
management types to the first-best policy carry over to
comparing renewable resource federalism alternatives to
each other. We find that a more spatially connected
resource (higher dispersal rates) favors federal one-size-
fits-all policy while greater heterogeneity favors manage-
ment by the states (Fig. 3). These gains increase toward
the extremes: no heterogeneity and high dispersal (y-axis
in Fig. 3) and high heterogeneity and no dispersal (x-
axis in Fig. 3). Away from the extremes, the relative
returns across the federal or state management regimes
vary and the location where preference for one over the
other changes based on the policy and source of hetero-
geneity (black line in Fig. 3A, B, D, and E).
With biological heterogeneity, the market-based fed-
eral regulation is always preferred to the uniform effort
policy (Fig. 3C). Based on aggregate value derived from
the system, federalism questions about the optimal level
of regulation should narrow to the choice between state-
level management and federal market-based policies.
However, with economic heterogeneity, discussions
around federalism are more complex, as the preferred
management regime varies depending on the dispersal
and heterogeneity levels. Market-based policies are only
preferred to command and control with low heterogene-
ity (Fig. 3F). This finding is consistent with larger losses
from market-based policies under economic heterogene-
ity (Fig. 1D and E). That command-and-control policies
may outperform market-based policies is also consistent
with results from the pollution control literature when
pollutants disperse over space (e.g., Oates et al. 1989).
Therefore, when states vary in the cost of harvesting,
framing the federalism question as a choice between fed-
eral versus state management can be misleading without
also acknowledging the different policies that can be
implemented at the federal level.
While focusing on the total value of the system pro-
vides insights into the political-economy of federalism
debates, renewable resource federalism also raises impor-
tant questions of fairness. The distribution of economic
returns and ecological outcomes across states can vary
by management type causing states to disagree about the
preferred level of management. Disagreement is not
inevitable however. Measuring a state’s preferred level of
management based on their NPV, we find that there are
some cases where both states favor the same manage-
ment regime. For example, both states prefer federal
management (dark blue regions in Fig. 4) when the
states are similar and the resource is mobile. Likewise,
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both states prefer decentralized state management (dark
red regions in Fig. 4) when the states are very different
and the resource is relatively stationary. The specific
degree of state heterogeneity and resource dispersal
needed to achieve consensus varies depending on the
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FIG. 2. Optimal biomass and fishing effort dynamic trajectories across the different management regimes (optimal, state, com-
mand and control [CnC], and market based). The case presented captures a medium dispersal rate scenario (d = 0.26, which is
approximately 70% of the maximum rate assumed in our analysis) and high heterogeneity scenario (r1 [Panels A–D] and c21 [Panels
E–H] are both approximately 62% greater than the other states’ parameters, respectively). The y-axis represents levels of biomass
(Panels A–B and E–F) and fishing effort (Panels C–D and G–H), and the x-axis represents the first 10 periods.
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FIG. 3. Federal vs. state management for an over-exploited resource under (A–C) biological heterogeneity and (D–F) economic
heterogeneity. For a given uniform federal management type (command and control or market based), the heat map (panels A, B
and D, E) measures the percent difference between the net present value of profits under state and federal management. In panels
A, B and D, E, red zones indicate that state management performs better, while blue zones indicate that federal management per-
forms better. Panels C and F, indicate the absolute winner across all policies, where red signals state management yields the highest
payoff, white signals the federal market-based policy yields the highest payoff, and blue signals the federal command and control
policy yields the highest payoff. In all cases, the black contour lines represents zero, where there is no difference in economic perfor-
mance between management regimes.
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FIG. 4. Fairness implications of federalism. All panels show the preferences of the states to different levels of management.
Dark red indicates both states prefer state-level management, dark blue indicates both states prefer federal management. Light red
(blue) indicates that one state prefers federal management and the other prefers state management but the total value of the
resource is largest under state (federal) management. Preference is defined as differences in the state’s net present value in the differ-
ent management regimes. Panels A and B compare state management to federal management (command and control or market
based) with biological heterogeneity between states. Panels C and D compare state management to federal management (command
and control or market based) with economic heterogeneity between states.
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source of heterogeneity. However, consensus is most
common when the federal government employs a mar-
ket-based approach (Fig. 4B and D). With biological
heterogeneity, there is often unanimous support for a
federal market-based approach (Fig. 4B) while unani-
mous support for decentralized state management is
more common with economic heterogeneity (Fig. 4D).
States may also disagree over the preferred manage-
ment regime (light blue and red areas in Fig. 4).
When disagreements arise, one state gains from a par-
ticular management regime and the other state loses.
Disagreements are particularly important since debates
about the appropriate level of management are often
resolved through a democratic process where each
state has some input in the decision. For example, if
changes in management regime are decided by major-
ity rule, disagreements between states may prevent
policies designed to protect an over-exploited resource.
Disagreements generally arise because state 1 prefers
state-level management (Appendix S1: Fig. S2) and
state 2 prefers federal-level management (Appendix
S1: Fig. S3) and are more common when the federal
government imposes a uniform effort policy rather
than a market-based policy.
While disagreements between states can perpetuate
inefficient use of the resource, the state that gains from a
particular management regime can compensate the loser
for their losses in that management regime (i.e., a side
payment). These side payments are mutually beneficial
and can resolve any disagreements and produce consen-
sus. For example, in the light blue (red) areas in Fig. 4,
there is disagreement but one state could compensate the
other leading to unanimous support for federal (state)
management. The boundary between the light blue and
light red areas is where there is no difference in economic
performance between management regimes. Near this
boundary, there is also little economic gain from a par-
ticular management regime. This suggests that disagree-
ments over management regimes are more likely when
the aggregate gains from a particular management
regime are relatively low.
Up to here, we have focused on the problem of
rebuilding an over-exploited resource starting from a
status quo of no management. However, many current
federal-state conflicts involve transferring management
authority from one level of government to another, as is
currently being discussed with the commercial Red
Snapper fishery in the Gulf of Mexico (Hotakainen
2017). Now we ask, under what conditions does the total
value of the system increase when switching from one
regime to another (e.g., state to federal market-based
system), and which states support the switch, if any (e.g.,
state 1 or state 2)? Switching entails adjustments to the
fishing effort levels, which in turn leads to adjustments
in the fish stocks over time as the levels in each state con-
verge toward a new steady state (Appendix S1:Fig. S5
illustrates the adjustment paths of the fish stocks). In
some cases, these adjustments result in increases in per
period economic profit relative to the status quo and in
some cases these adjustments result in losses. In Fig. 5,
we show the preference to switch or remain in the status
quo based on the system-wide discounted sum of these
per period profits (NPV).
When the status quo is a federal policy imposing uni-
form effort levels (Fig. 5A and C), incentives to switch
to a state-based policy exist when there are large differ-
ences in local conditions (both ecological and eco-
nomic). The reverse is also true, in that when starting at
a state policy, both states prefer to remain in that system
under high levels of heterogeneity (Fig. 5E and G).
Where the preferences switch, however, in these two
cases varies and is not symmetric across the different sta-
tus quo settings (black lines in Fig. 5A, C, E, and G).
These differences stem from the particulars of each sce-
nario, including the status quo steady-state levels, which
vary based on the underlying local conditions and dis-
persal, the endogenous response of biological dispersal
to the switch in the management regime, and the
required actions to adjust the system from one steady
state to another.
Because the losses from imposing a market-based fed-
eral policy under biological heterogeneity are minimal
compared to the first-best (Fig. 1B), the fact that the
federal policy is preferred regardless of the status quo is
not surprising (Fig. 5B and F). The exception is when
there is low dispersal and the starting point is state man-
agement (Fig. 5F). Even in this case, the gains from stay-
ing are essentially zero (shading in Fig. 5 represents the
NPV gains in staying or switching).
While the above analysis varies the nature and
degree of heterogeneity in the system along with the
dispersal rates, some conditions are held fixed, such as
the discount rate, initial case of starting from an
exploited system, and the nature of the cost hetero-
geneity. We ran a number of sensitivity analyses to
determine whether changing these underlying parame-
ters impacts the qualitative nature of our solutions.
Specifically, we ran the same sets of analyses with a
high discount rate (δ = 0.10, Appendix S1: Figs. S7–-
S10) and a low discount rate (δ = 0, Appendix S1:
Figs. S11–S14). The qualitative nature of the solutions
is robust to these changes. We did find, however, that
the shape of the regions where one type of regime is
favored over another is impacted, but the overall loca-
tion of the regions in the heterogeneity-spillover space
is similar. The results are also robust to starting out
with a relatively unexploited fish stock level (80% of
carrying capacity, Appendix S1: Figs. S15–S18), where
the optimal dynamic paths of fishing effort fish down
the fish stock to their new steady-state levels. Finally,
we considered the case where rather than increasing
the marginal cost of fishing in patch 2, we decrease the
cost of fishing in patch 1 to investigate whether results
vary since these scenarios lead to a more profitable
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FIG. 5. Preferences for switching between federalism regimes. The heat map in each panel measures the percent difference
between the net present value of rents under status quo management and a change in management regime. Federal management is
the status quo in Panels A–D and state management is the status quo in Panels E–H. Panels A–B and E–F vary biological hetero-
geneity, and Panels C–D and G–H vary economic heterogeneity. Panels A, C, E and G evaluate the federal uniform effort policy
and Panels B,D,F, and H evaluate the federal market-based policy. In each panel, the initial conditions are the steady-state under
the status quo, which varies with the underlying heterogeneity (horizontal axis) and dispersal rate (vertical axis).
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fishery overall. The results are symmetric to the nature
of the cost changes.
DISCUSSION
Renewable resource federalism presents a spectrum of
management alternatives, characterized by the level of
government at which authority is located, the structure
of the policy applied, and the degree to which inter-state
uniformity constrains decision making. For a given fed-
eralism alternative, we find that economic performance,
ecological outcomes, and the implications for fairness
are determined by the heterogeneity and connectivity in
the spatial dynamics of the managed resource.
Broadly speaking, our results are consistent with the
environmental federalism work on pollution control
characterized by fixed, unidirectional spillover of pollu-
tants from one jurisdiction to another, even though in
our setting the direction and magnitude of biomass spil-
lover is endogenous and varying over time. One differ-
ence is that, while we find that decentralized control
leads to higher levels of exploitation than the first best
policy, classifying the "state" managers as racing to the
bottom is not a fait accompli. The steady-state stock
sizes we find are all above U.S. fishery management
thresholds for overfished stocks (Dept. of Commerce
2016). With renewable resources, the level of the stock
drives the overall productivity of the fishery, while pollu-
tion is part of the waste stream associated with produc-
tion of a valuable commodity. Of course, there might be
settings where state management is incapable of moni-
toring and enforcing fishery regulations that could lead
to a race to the bottom; in our setting, we assumed that
institutions to manage the resource where available at
each scale and equally effective. Future work could con-
sider different management capacities at the different
scales of governance and how that can feed back into
benefits and costs of renewable resource federalism
debates.
The implications of federalism for the economic
value and fairness of natural capital management are
increasingly the focus of public policy debates. While
our broad patterns are consistent with the prior liter-
ature, we uncover several situations that cast a sha-
dow on using simple rules of thumb when discussing
the benefits and costs of one scale of control over
another. We find that the key mechanisms behind the
trade-offs across the different management regimes
include whether differences in local conditions are dri-
ven by biological or economic mechanisms, whether
the federal government employs uniform command
and control or market-based policies, the spatial and
temporal distribution of economic returns across the
locales, and the status quo management regime. While
spillover and local forms of heterogeneity were a
focus of the earlier literature (notably Costello and
Kaffine 2017), the roles that different types of federal
control, the nature of the heterogeneity, and the status
quo management regime play in determining the ben-
efits and costs of federalism are key insights into the
political-economy discussions around renewable
resource federalism.
There are a number of possible extensions to our
model that would permit the analysis of additional
political economy dimensions of renewable resource
federalism. For example, we do not consider adminis-
trative costs due to switching, which given that some
of the gains to switching are quite small could swamp
the decision on whether to remain or switch to
another regime. Market linkages, for example through
output markets, can also create cross-jurisdictional
spillover that could affect the preferences for different
scales of government regulation. We also abstracted
away from ecological complexity by considering a bio-
mass model with a single per-capita dispersal rate.
Multiple species trophic models with varying dispersal
rates across the trophic levels are more realistic and
will likely provide interesting trade-offs across species
and one-size-fits-all policies. Dispersal patterns across
habitats and life stages, which are often spatially
explicit, are also important to consider. In general,
the ecological influence on economic outcomes has
received only limited attention in analyses of federal-
ism; we believe our research argues for more attention
to these issues. Furthermore, the complexity of many
of the comparisons we make would not have been
possible to uncover without our dynamic optimization
approach. To provide useful insight into the merits of
federalism alternatives for a given resource, we argue
that future analysis should similarly adopt a dynamic
perspective that accounts for how the given context of
resource growth and movement across space can
determine the performance of management.
While our modeling approach provides several new
insights, our results also suggest that a great deal must
be known about the biology and economics of a resource
in order to rank federal and state policies. An important
empirical question when undertaking these comparisons
is how much of the efficiency gains from the first-best
policy can be achieved by federal uniform (second-best)
policies. If federal one-size-fits-all polices can capture
most of the efficiency gains from state-specific policies,
federal management likely represents the preferred
approach. Recent empirical work suggests that the effi-
ciency costs of federal policies can be approximated
using simple regression statistics (Jacobsen et al. 2020).
Adapting these methods for renewable resource manage-




The biological component of our model represents the
continuous-time dynamics of two harvested fish stocks,
Xxxxx 2021 RENEWABLE RESOURCE FEDERALISM Article e02276; page 11
x1(t) and x2(t), the populations of which are connected




¼ rixi tð Þ 1xi tð ÞKi
 
d xi tð Þxj tð Þ
 qiEi tð Þxi tð Þ:
(1)
Here i, j ∈ {1,2} index states, with j ≠ i.
The stocks grow logistically, with intrinsic rate of
increase ri and carrying capacity Ki, in each state i.
Fish move from one state to the other at a constant
per-capita rate, d. Fishing mortality in state i is the
product of fishing effort Ei(t) and qi, the catchability
in state i.
The economic value of fishing is measured through
the rate of fishing profit accumulation at the state
level
πi xi tð Þ,Ei tð Þð Þ≡ piqixi tð Þ ci1þ ci2Ei tð Þ½ ð ÞEi tð Þ: (2)
Fishing profit πi(t) received by state i depends on the
landings price pi, the current stock level in the state’s
fishery, and costs of fishing effort that are sensitive to
short-run adjustment (via cost-of-effort parameters ci1
and ci2). The net present value of the current and future





subject to the population dynamics (Eq. 1); δ is a con-
ventional discount rate.
For all types of federal management, the objective
is to maximize J1(E1(t)) + J2(E2(t)) by managing the
path of fishing effort in each state Ei(t) subject to
Eqs. 1 and 2, initial conditions for the fish population
(x0) and non-negativity constraints, x(t) ≥ 0 and
Ei tð Þ≥ 08t. First-best federal management selects
optimal effort paths (see the Appendix S1: Section S1.1
for further details).
Spatially uniform federal policies impose additional
constraints on effort. Under the optimal uniform effort
policy, the federal government maximizes the NPV of
fishery profits while enforcing an equal amount of fish-
ing effort in each state such that E1ðtÞ¼E2ðtÞ8t (see the
Appendix S1: Section S1.2 for further details). Alterna-
tively, under the uniform market-based policy, the fed-
eral government chooses the optimal paths of fishing
effort that satisfy
∂π x1 tð Þ,E1 tð Þð Þ
∂E1 tð Þ ¼
∂π x2 tð Þ,E2 tð Þð Þ
∂E2 tð Þ 8t:
Imposing this constraint is akin to a uniform quota
price (marginal value of an additional unit of the fish
stock) that results when two fishing quota markets are
linked via quota trading (Sanchirico and Wilen 2005).
For this reason, we label this policy as market-based (see
the Appendix S1: Section S1.3).
When management of the fishery is decentralized, we
model the state-level policy as the outcome of a non-co-
operative dynamic game (Kamien and Schwartz 1991).
In this game, state i anticipates the time path of fishing
effort chosen by state j and solves its optimization
accordingly (i∈ {1,2} while j∈ {1,2} such that i ≠ j).










¼ rixi tð Þ 1xi tð ÞKi
 
d xj tð Þxi tð Þ




¼ rjxj tð Þ 1xj tð ÞK j
 
d xi tð Þxj tð Þ
 qjE j tð Þxj tð Þ:
(6)
Here EjðtÞ is the time path of fishing effort state i
anticipates state j will choose, and Ĵ i E j tð Þ
 
is the maxi-
mized net present value of profits in patch i conditional
on the time path of effort in state j. State i’s optimization
is also subject to initial conditions and non-negativity
constraints on effort and stock levels discussed above.
See the Appendix S1: Section S1.4 for further details.
A Nash equilibrium in management strategies is one
where neither state has an incentive to deviate from their
own strategy. To solve the game, we take a direct
approach to finding open-loop solutions, so-called
because it performs direct numerical optimization of
each state’s objective functional using pseudo-spectral
collocation (Benson et al. 2006). Specifically, we utilize
pseudo-spectral collocation and nonlinear optimization
to maximize an approximation of Ĵ i E j tð Þ
 
over a long
but finite time horizon subject to the problem con-
straints and the current guess for state j’s fishing strat-
egy, and vice versa. This process iterates until the sum
Ĵ1 E2 tð Þ
 þ Ĵ2 E1 tð Þ  converges, producing open-loop
Nash equilibrium controls EGi tð Þ. Additional details on
our solution method are provided in the Appendix S1:
Section S2. Applications of methods to solve dynamic
games appear to be rare and either focused on indirect
methods (based on solving the state and co-state Hamil-
tonian canonical system of ordinary differential equa-
tions) or limited to problems with special structure
(Dockner et al. 2000, Guangyan et al. 2016, Nikooeine-
jad et al. 2016, Costello and Kaffine 2017).
We solve all variations of the federal government’s
problem using the same direct pseudo-spectral methods
we apply in our algorithm for the state-level problem.
Article e02276; page 12 JAMES N. SANCHIRICO ETAL.
Ecological Applications
Vol. 0, No. 0
Evaluations of the relative performance of the manage-
ment regimes are measured through comparing NPV of
state-level profits when different solutions are applied.
For example, we compare the NPV of first-best solution
to the NPV of the command-and-control (C) solution,
where the optimal spatially uniform effort policy EC(t) is
first computed and then inputted to evaluate
J1 EC tð Þ
 þJ2 EC tð Þ . Similarly, with the solutions
EGi ðtÞ to the decentralized alternative computed, we
aggregate NPV by evaluating J1ðEG1 ðtÞÞþJ2ðEG2 ðtÞÞ.
Appendix S1: Section S3 describes how we calculate the
NPVof switching from one regime to another.
Model parameterization
We solve for fishery dynamics under different manage-
ment regimes while varying parameters that capture
structural heterogeneity (e.g., ri and ci1) and spillover
(dispersal rate parameter d). Anchoring this exploration
of the model is a set of baseline parameter values chosen
to facilitate solutions in the neighborhood of parameter
space that are both well-behaved and informative (See
Appendix S1:Table S1 for the levels).
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